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COMMENTS
THE INSURER'S RIGHT TO SEEK
REIMBURSEMENT: WILL THE BUSS STOP IN
OKLAHOMA?
I. INTRODUCTION

Although not necessarily a new issue, the commercial insurer's right to seek
reimbursement of defense costs expended on claims ultimately determined not to be
covered merits renewed attention given the trend of recent case law. The insurer's
right to seek reimbursement has been greatly enhanced by the California Supreme
Court decision in Buss v. Superior Court In Buss, the court held for the first time
that in a mixed action, an action in which covered and non-covered claims are
asserted, an insurer has a duty to defend the entire action as a duty imposed by law.'
However, if the insurer has reserved the right to seek reimbursement, it may be
entitled to seek reimbursement from its insured for defense costs allocated to those
claims which were never potentially covered.' Buss and its progeny have developed
guidelines which a commercial liability insurer may follow in order to preserve and
successfully claim the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs in a mixed action.4
Oklahoma appears to have only one case that discusses the insurer's right to
seek reimbursement of costs.5 Although the application of the case is likely limited
to the specific facts of that case, analogies may be made to the rationale utilized in
the Buss opinion. California insurance law is persuasive and consistent with the
general state of insurance law in Oklahoma addressing the insurer's duty to defend
and to reserve rights to later challenge coverage.6 Therefore, California insurance law
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997).
See id. at 774.
See id. at776-78.
See discussion infra at Part III.
See Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 347 P.2d 226 (Okla. 1959).
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lends itself to an analysis concerning the direction Oklahoma may take on the issue
of reimbursement. Additionally, other jurisdictions have dealt with the reimbursement issue and have done so with varying depths of treatment. Nevertheless, the
various opinions provide guidance and direction concerning the insurer's right to seek
reimbursement of defense costs.
Section I of this comment reviews the general development of the insurer's
right to seek reimbursement of defense costs in the state of California. Next, Section
III provides an analysis of California case law concerning the reimbursement issue,
culminating with a discussion of the California Supreme Court's decision in Buss.
Finally, Section IV continues the analysis by assessing Oklahoma's potential response
to the right to reimbursement issue in light of Buss, concluding that Oklahoma will
likely adopt the rationale established by Buss.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SEEK REIMBURSEMENT

In California, the right of the commercial insurer to seek reimbursement of
defense costs from its insured in a single action arose out of the insurer's duty to
defend its insured.7 The progression of California case law prior to the Buss opinion
provides four basic propositions regarding the insurer's right to seek reimbursement
of defense costs. The first proposition established by California case law is that the
insurer has the duty to defend whenever the insurer ascertains facts which give rise
to potential liability! The second proposition is that the insurer must reserve the
right or have an understanding that the insurer will later seek the right to reimbursement if it is determined that the insurer had no duty to defend.9 The third proposition
established that the right to reimbursement was based on contract law and not on the
equitable doctrine of restitution.1" The last proposition established that the insured's
silence or simple objection to the insurer's reservation of rights is not sufficient to
defeat the right to reimbursement."1 The distinguishing factor in the cases prior to the
decision in Buss is that those pre-Buss cases did not involve a mixed action. In a
mixed action at least one of the claims is potentially covered and at least one of the
claims is potentially not covered." The Buss opinion decided for the first time in
California that the insurer could seek reimbursement of defense costs in a mixed
action and based that right on the doctrine of restitution. 3

6. See discussion infra at Part Ill.
7. See Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Moskopoulos, 172 Cal. Rptr. 248 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
8. See id.
9. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 804 F.2d 520,522 (9th Cir. 1986).
10. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), disapproved by Buss v.
Superior Court, 939 P.2d766 (Cal. 1997); Insurance Co. oftheNWestv. Haralambos Beverage Co., 241 Cal. Rptr.427,
428 (Cal Ct. App. 1987), disapproved by Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997).
11. See Omaha Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cardon Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 502,503-05 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Walbrook Ins. Co.,
Ltd. v. Goshgarian & Goshgarian, 726 F. Supp. 777 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
12. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 921 (Cal. 1997).
13. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 776-78.
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The Route to Buss

A.

In California, the insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense costs for
claims not potentially covered begins with Safeco Title Insurance Co. v.
Moskopoulos. 14 Safeco, a title insurer, brought a declaratory judgment action to
establish whether Safeco had the duty to defend Moskopoulos, a real estate broker,
in a suit arising from a flawed purchase of residential property.15 Safeco agreed to
provide a defense to Moskopoulos under a reservation of rights. Safeco reserved the
right to assert the defense that it had no duty to defend and that Safeco had a right to
reimbursement of attorney fees paid for Moskopoulos's defense. 6
The trial court rendered judgment for Safeco and held that Safeco did not have
the duty to defend Moskopoulos. 7 Additionally, without discussion, the trial court
awarded Safeco its attorney fees, costs, expenses, and interest in defending
Moskopoulos 8
On review, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision that S afeco had
no duty to defend Moskopoulos because the claim came within an exclusion under the
policy.1 9 The appellate court based its opinion on the rationale that because the duty
to defend is broader than the obligation to indemnify, "the courts have imposed a duty
to defend whenever the insurer ascertains facts which give rise to the possibility or
'potential' of liability to indemnify."2 ° The appellate court affirmed the award of
attorney fees, costs, expenses, and interest without discussion.2 1 At best,
Moskopoulos recognized the right of the insurer to seek reimbursement of defense
costs for non-covered claims; however, the court gave no reasoning for the award of
costs.
A subsequent California case in which the insurer sought reimbursement of
costs was Western Employers InsuranceCo. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc. 22 In Western
Employers, Arciero, the insured, was sued regarding damage to condominiums for
which it was the general contractor. Arciero tendered defense of the action to
Western, the insurer, which accepted under a reservation of rights, contending that
the claims were excluded under the policy. 23 Western settled the claims and then filed
a declaratory judgment action against Arciero, "seeking restitution for the sums it
paid in defending and settling" the claims.24
The trial court determined as a matter of law that the claims were not covered
under the policy and granted judgment to Western without discussion as to the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See Moskopoulos, 172 Cal. Rptr. 248.
See id. at 249-51.
See id. at 250-51.
See id. at 249.
See id.
Seeid. at253.
See Moskopoulos, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (quoting Gray V. Zurich, 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966)).
See id. at 253.
See Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
See id. at 688.
See id.
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entitlement of reimbursement.' The appellate court affirmed, holding that because
Western was not potentially liable for damages under the policy, Western had no duty
to defend Arciero. 26
The first California case which directly discussed the issue of reimbursement
of defense costs was St. PaulMercuryIns. Co. v. Ralee Engineering Co." In Ralee,
the insurer, St. Paul, brought a declaratory judgment action against Ralee to establish
that St. Paul did not have the duty to defend Ralee in an action alleging wrongful
termination of employment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.2" St. Paul
undertook the duty to defend Ralee under a reservation of rights to deny coverage at
a later time.2 9 The district court found that although St. Paul did not have the duty
to defend Ralee, St. Paul was not entitled to reimbursement of costs expended in
defending Ralee.3" The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.31
St. Paul argued that the opinion in Western Employers32 was controlling.33 The
appellate court found Western Employers unpersuasive because the case did not hold
as a matter of law that the insurer is always entitled to reimbursement of costs
expended in defense of a claim where the insurer had no duty to defend in the first
instance.34 The court found that although St. Paul did not have a duty to defend
Ralee, it was not entitled to reimbursement because the reservation of rights did not
specifically seek reimbursement nor was there an understanding between the parties
that Ralee would seek reimbursement of costs.35 While the Ralee court did not hold
as a matter of law that when the insurer has no duty to defend, the insurer is entitled
to reimbursement of defense costs, it did set the stage for later rulings. 36 The court's
opinion suggested that in order for costs to be reimbursable to the insurer, there must
be an understanding between the insured and the insurer. 37 The Ralee court further
suggested that the understanding between the parties may originate in the reservation
of rights if it specifically reserves the right to seek reimbursement.38
The right to seek reimbursement of defense costs further evolved in Travelers
v. Lesher.3 9 In Lesher, the insured was named as a defendant in an antitrust
lawsuit.' ° Lesher tendered the defense of the action to his liability insurer,
Travelers." Travelers accepted the defense under a reservation of rights that it had

25. See id. at 689.
26. See id. at 691.
27. See Ralee, 804 F.2d 520.

28. See id.
29. See id. at 522.

30. See d.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Seek!.
See Lesher,231 Cal. Rptr. at 794; Haralambos,241 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
See Raee, 804 F.2d at 522.
See id.

35. See id.
36. See id. at 522-23.
37. See id. at 522.

38. Seek!.
39. See Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 794.

40. See k!
41. See id.
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no duty to defend because the policy did not provide coverage. 42 Travelers filed a
declaratory judgment action to establish that Travelers had no duty to defend or
indemnify, and to seek reimbursement of costs incurred in defending Lesher. 43 On
Travelers' motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, the trial
court granted the motion finding that Travelers had no duty to defend or indemnify
Lesher.' Subsequent to the grant of summary judgment, Travelers filed a motion
seeking entitlement to attorney's fees and expenses. 45 The trial court granted Lesher's
46
motion for non-suit on Travelers' claims for reimbursement of fees and costs.
The appellate court found that the trial court properly ruled Travelers had no
duty to defend or indemnify Lesher because of an exclusion under the policy. 47
Travelers argued on appeal of the non-suit regarding reimbursement of fees and costs
that the letter sent to Lesher was a complete reservation of rights and was sufficient
for decision by the trier of fact. 48 The appellate court, however, found that the letter
did not mention Travelers' intention to seek reimbursement and therefore held, as a
matter of law, the reservation of fights was insufficient to entitle Travelers to
reimbursement.49
Travelers argued in the alternative that its claim for reimbursement had support
in the equitable doctrine of quasi-contract or restitution.50 The appellate court found
the argument unpersuasive. 5 The court based its rationale on principles of restitution
that "a person who, incidental to the performance of his own duty or to the protection
of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to
contribution."5' 2 In other words, the insurer who assumes the defense of the insured
under a reservation of rights does so not only to benefit the insured, but also in "large
part to protect the insurer from a subsequent claim that it breached its insurance
contract with the insured."53 Therefore, the court found that the doctrine of restitution
did not entitle Travelers to seek reimbursement for attorney's fees and costs expended
54
defending Lesher.
California law concerning the right to seek reimbursement further unfolded in
Insurance Company of the West v. Haralambos Beverage Company.55 In
Haralambos,the insured was sued for breach of contract.5 6 The insured tendered
defense to Insurance Company of the West ("ICW") who accepted under a

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 795.
See Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 809.
See id.
See id.
See Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
Id.
See id
Seeid. at810.
See Haralambos,241 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
See id.
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reservation of rights to later deny coverage. 57 The case was tried to a jury which
found against Haralambos and awarded contract damages to the plaintiff.58
ICW filed a declaratoryjudgment action seeking a declaration that ICW did not
have a duty to defend or indemnify under the policy.59 ICW additionally sought
60
equitable indemnification for defense costs expended on behalf of Haralambos.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of 1CW and awarded ICW its defense
costs. 6 Haralambos appealed.62
The appellate court found that Haralambos's claim under the 1CW policy was
not potentially covered under the policy, and therefore, ICW had no duty to defend
or indemnify. 63 Regarding the reimbursement of costs, 1CW argued that courts have
affirmed judgments in which insurers sought reimbursement of defense costs when
the insurer had no duty to defendf' In support of ICW's contention, the court cited
Western Employers65 and Moskopoulos. 66 However, the appellate court found no
case that held as a matter of law that an insurer is entitled to seek reimbursement of
defense costs when the insurer had no duty to defend.67 The appellate court stated
there were only two possible theories of recovery: (1) "an agreement or understanding
between the parties that the insured would reimburse the insurer" for costs of defense
when coverage issues are determined in the insurer's favor and (2) "equitable
restitution. ' 68 Regarding the first theory, the court found there was no evidence of an
agreement or understanding between the parties that Haralambos would reimburse
ICW as a matter of law, and therefore, summary judgment was improperly granted.6 9
With respect to the equitable restitution theory, the court stated the general rule that
"money voluntarily paid to another with knowledge of the facts cannot be recovered
back."7 ° The court additionally adopted the rationale of Lesher7' and held that
whether "ICW conferred a benefit incidental to the protection of its own interests"
was a question of fact for the jury.72
In Omaha Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Cardon Oil Company, the insurer,
Omaha, filed a declaratory judgment action against the defendants for relief regarding
insurance coverage under a comprehensive general liability insurance policy.7 3
Cardon was sued for securities fraud and Omaha accepted the duty to defend subject

57. See id.
58. See id. at 429.

59. See id.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id.
See Haralambos,241 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
See id.
See id. at 430.
See id. at 434.
See Western Employers, 194 Cal. Rptr. 688.
See Moskopoulos,172 Cal. Rptr. 248.
See Haralambos,241 Cal. Rptr. at 434.

68. Id.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id.
Id.
See Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
Haralambos,241 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
Omaha, 687 F. Supp. at 503.
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to a reservation of rights that it had no coverage and specifically reserving the right
to seek reimbursement of all defense costs.74 The district court found that Omaha did
not have the duty to defend Cardon because the alleged claims were not covered under
75
the subject policy.
Omaha filed a subsequent motion in the declaratory judgment action seeking
reimbursement of costs and fees expended in defending Cardon.76 Omaha's
reservation of rights letter stated:
Additionally[,] Omaha Indemnity specifically reserves its right to seek reimbursement of all defense costs, including attorney's fees ....
In that regard, it is
contemplated that a declaratory relief action will be filed ....That action will
also seek reimbursement of any defense costs paid to or on behalf of any person
or entity claiming entitlement to defense or indemnity under the policy.'
The court found Cardon was aware of Omaha's intention to seek reimbursement of
its costs. 78 Cardon argued that because it never responded to the reservation of rights
letter, there was no understanding or agreement between the parties. 79 Cardon argued
that a unilateral reservation of rights was not sufficient to allow reimbursement of
defense costs.8 0
Relying on Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc.,8 the district
court found California law allowed the insurer to be reimbursed its fees in defending
against claims for which there was no duty to defend. 2 The court, however, relying
on St. PaulMercury Ins. Co. v. Ralee Engineering Co.,83 held that an insurer was
not entitled to reimbursement unless there was an understanding between the parties
that the right to reimbursement would be sought in the event there was no duty to
defend.8' Cardon argued that its silence could not "constitute acquiescence," citing
Insurance Company of the West v. HaralambosBeverage Co. 85 The district court
found this argument unpersuasive and stated that in both St. Paul and Haralambos,
"the reservation of rights letters sent by the insurers made no reference to reimbursement of litigation expenses"86 whereas here, the reservation of rights specifically
spoke to the reimbursement of defense costs.87 The Omaha court held that because
the insurer expressly and specifically reserved its right to seek reimbursement of
defense costs and because there was no evidence that the insured expressly refused

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 504.
See Omaha, 687 F. Supp. at 504.
See id.
See id.
See Western Employers, 194 Cal. Rptr. 688.
See Omaha, 687 F. Supp. at 504.
See Ralee, 804 F.2d 520.
See Omaha, 687 F. Supp. at 504.
See Halambros 241 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
Omaha, 687 F. Supp. at 504-05.
See id. at 505.
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to consent to the insurer's reservation of rights, the insurer adequately reserved its
rights to seek reimbursement of litigation costs. 8 Therefore, the Omaha court's
holding allowed the insured's silence to constitute acquiescence to the reservation of
rights and seemed to further require that the insured take positive steps to refuse to
consent to a reservation of rights.8 9
In Walbrook Insurance Company Ltd. v. Goshgarian & Goshgarian,the
positive steps to refuse to consent to a reservation of rights, as implied in Omaha,
were expanded.90 Walbrook, the insurer, accepted the duty to defend under a
reservation of rights which specifically reserved the right to recover defense costs. 91
Walbrook filed an action for declaratory relief seeking a declaration of its rights and
reimbursement of costs paid to defend the insured, Goshgarian.92 The insured moved
for summary judgment on the issues of the insurer's duty to defend and the insurer's
entitlement to reimbursement.93 The court, due to a lack of evidence, found it was
precluded from94granting summary judgment regarding whether Walbrook had the
duty to defend.
Goshgarian argued in its summary judgment brief that even if Walbrook did not
have the duty to defend, Walbrook was not entitled to reimbursement of defense costs
because Walbrook did not make an adequate reservation of rights.95 Goshgarian's
rationale was that the reservation of rights was not adequate because Goshgarian
expressly refused to consent to the reservation.96 In fact, Goshgarian, in two separate
letters, acknowledged the defense but objected to the reservation of rights.97
However, despite the objections, Goshgarian accepted payments in excess of
$500,000 for costs of defense. 98 The court found that since Goshgarian knew
Walbrook intended to seek reimbursement, there was an understanding between the
parties. 99 While the insured expressly objected to the reservation of rights, the
insured nevertheless accepted the payment of defense costs by the insurer. "0 The
court found that by accepting the payment of defense costs that there was an implied
agreement to the reservation of rights, and therefore, as a matter of law, Walbrook
adequately reserved its right to reimbursement.' 0 ' The court concluded that if it was
established that Walbrook had no duty to defend Goshgarian, then Walbrook was
entitled to reimbursement of its attorney fees and defense costs paid."°

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id.
See id.
See Walbrook, 726 F. Supp. at 778-82.
See id. at 778-82.
See id. at 778.
See id. at 779.
See id. at 781.
See id.
See Walbrook 726 F. Supp. at 781.
See id. at 782.
See Ud
See id. at 784-85.
See id. at785.
See id.
See Walbrook, 726 F. Supp. at 785.
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In American MotoristsInsuranceCo. v. Allied-Sysco FoodServices, Inc., the
insured, Allied, was sued for sexually discriminatory hiring practices. 3 Allied
tendered the defense of the action to its insurer, American Motorists Insurance
Company ("AMICO")."" AMICO accepted the defense subject to a reservation of
rights to later deny coverage.'0 5 AMICO filed a declaratory relief action seeking a
determination of no duty to defend and seeking reimbursement." 6
AMICO argued entitlement to reimbursement of its costs because its reservation
of rights created an understanding between the parties. 10 7 The court, however,
disagreed finding that an understanding had not been created because the reimbursement language was not contained in the first reservation of rights letter but was
contained in the third letter sent to Allied which was sent after AMICO had already
begun to pay defense costs.'0 3 Moreover, the court found that AMICO's reservation
of rights letter "expressly conditioned reimbursement" upon Allied's approval and
that because approval was not received, there was no agreement to reimburse
AMICO.' 9 Therefore, AMICO was not entitled to reimbursement of its costs." 0
In conclusion, before Buss was decided, California courts recognized the
insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense costs for an uncovered claim in an
action where either all claims or no claims were potentially covered."' The courts
began by establishing that insurers have a duty to defend whenever the insurer
ascertains facts which give rise to potential liability." 2 The California courts next
suggested that in order for costs to be reimbursable to the insurer, there had to be an
understanding between the parties which could originate, if specifically stated, in a
reservation of rights letter." 3 The natural progression led to opinions deciding how
the right could be reserved. More specifically, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California held that the reservation of rights is effective even
when an insured is silent because his silence is deemed acquiescence to the reserved
rights." 4 Going further, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California held that the reservation of the right to seek reimbursement is effective
even when the insured objects to the reservation of rights if the insured has accepted
the defense." 5 A California appellate court held that the right to seek reimbursement
must be reserved expressly in the reservation of rights letter prior to paying for
defense costs." 6 Prior to Buss, the right to seek reimbursement was based on single

103.
1993),
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Allied-Sysco Food Services, Inc., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 108 (Cal. Ct. App.
disapprovedby Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 114.
See id.
See American, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
See id. at 114-15.
See discussion supraPart rrr.A.
See Moskopoulos, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
See Ralee, 804 F.2d at 522.
See Omaha, 687 F. Supp. at 505.
See Walbrook, 726 F. Supp. at 785.
See American, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 35 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 8

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:599

action claims and founded in basic contract law."' The California Supreme Court
in Buss established the right to seek reimbursement in a mixed action and based that
right on principles of restitution."'
B.

The Buss Arrives

In 1997 the Supreme Court of California decided Buss v. Superior Court.119
The Buss court found that the insurer was entitled to seek reimbursement from the
insured for defense costs expended on claims that were not even potentially covered
under its policy in a mixed action. 20 Jerry Buss "owned and operated the Los Angles
Lakers, a professional basketball team, the Los Angles Lazers, a professional indoor
soccer team, the Los Angeles Kings, a professional hockey team..... Great Western
Forum indoor sports arena.. ., and owned and operated, at least indirectly and in
part, certain cable television broadcasting networks. '12' H & H Sports, Inc. brought
an action against Buss asserting twenty-seven causes of action against Buss and
Buss-related persons and entities. 22 Buss tendered the defense of the action to12his
3
insurers, including Transamerica Insurance Company ("Transamerica").
Transamerica was the only insurer which did not refuse to defend and deny
coverage.124
Buss contracted with Transamerica for two commercial general liability
25
("CGL") insurance policies which were relevant to the H & H Sports action.1
Transamerica accepted the defense of the H & H Sports action under both CGL
policies because included in the twenty-seven causes of action was a defamation
cause of action which Transamerica conceded was potentially within the coverage of
the CGL policies.'2 6 Although Transamerica accepted the defense of the H & H
Sports action, it did so under a reservation of rights. 27 Included in Transamerica's
reservation of rights was the statement, "[w]ith respect to defense costs incurred or
to be incurred in the future, Transamerica reserves full rights to be reimbursed and/or
an allocation of attorney's fees and expenses in this action if it is determined that
there is no coverage under this policy."'28 The opinion suggests that Buss and
Transamerica entered into a separate agreement supported by consideration that
provided "[i]f a court ...orders that defense costs be shared pro rata by... Buss.
.and Transamerica... Buss... shall reimburse Transamerica for the appropriate

117. See discussion infra Part I. A.
118. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 776-77.
119. See id. at 766.
120. See id. at 776-77.
121. See id. at769.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 769.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Buss v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447,450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), review grantedand op. superseded,
917 P. 2d 1165 (Cal. 1996), affd, 939 P. 2d 766 (1997).
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'
pro rata share of the fees and costs paid to that date."129
The purported agreement,
however, was merely a letter from counsel for Buss agreeing to hourly rates among
other things, and a statement that if an arbitrator found that defense costs were to be
shared on a pro rata basis, Buss would reimburse Transamerica for the appropriate
pro rata share.13
Although Transamerica argued as one of its theories for
reimbursement that this was a separate agreement, the court disregarded the
agreement without discussion.' 3
Buss later settled the H & H Sports action, paying H & H Sports several million
dollars.132 Transamerica ultimately spent approximately $1,000,000 defending Buss;
however, defense of the defamation claim accounted for only about $55,000 of the
total defense cost. 13 3 Buss requested that Transamerica contribute to the settlement
134
but Transamerica refused.
Buss filed suit against Transamerica asserting causes of action for breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
declaratory relief.1 35 Transamerica filed a cross-complaint seeking declaratory relief
that Transamerica did not owe coverage to Buss and therefore did not have to
contribute to the settlement.1 36 Additionally, Transamerica sought a declaration that
137
Transamerica had a right to seek reimbursement of defense costs.
38
Transamerica moved the court for summary judgment on Buss's complaint.1
The superior court granted Transamerica' s summaryjudgment, finding that there was
139
no reasonable basis for Transamerica to be required to contribute to the settlement.
Subsequently, Buss moved the court for summary judgment on Transamerica's
cross-complaint.14 The superior court denied Buss's motion. 141 In light of the denial
of his motion, Buss filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to the California Court
of Appeals. 42 The Court of Appeals denied the peremptory writ and found that
Buss's summary judgment was subject to independent review. 43 Upon review, the
court held that in the absence of policy language or an express agreement supported
by consideration, an insurer may not recover costs expended defending a claim for
which there was a potential for coverage. 144 The court further held that an insurer
which has defended under a specific reservation of rights to seek reimbursement, may

129. Id.
130. Telephone interview with John R. Brydon, Attorney, Haines, Lea & Brydon (October 25, 1999) (Mr. Brydon
was co-counsel with James E. Gibbons representing Transamerica Insurance Company in Buss v. SuperiorCourt).
131. Id.
132. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 770.
133. See id.
134. Seeid. at771.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
13S. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 771.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Buss, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
144. See id. at 455.
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be entitled to reimbursement if it can show a fair and reasonable allocation145of defense
costs made between potentially covered claims and non-covered claims.
Following the Court of Appeals decision, Buss petitioned the Supreme Court
of California for review." 4 The supreme court granted147review and stayed the
proceedings in the superior court pending a determination.
The court granted review to resolve the following four issues related to
commercial general liability policies: (1) may the insurer seek reimbursement from
the insured for defense costs; (2) for what specific costs may the insurer obtain
reimbursement; (3) when the insurer seeks148reimbursement, who has the burden of
proof; and (4) what is the burden of proof.
The court began its analysis with a discussion of relevant insurance law,
concluding with a determination of the insurer's duty to defend in a mixed action. 4 9
In a mixed action, the insurer has the duty to defend the entire mixed action
"prophylactically as an obligation imposed by law in support of the policy."'"5 In
other words, if an insured tenders defense to the insurer in a suit which has a mix of
potentially covered claims and potentially51 non-covered claims, the insurer must
nevertheless defend the suit in its entirety.
Based on the insurer's duty to defend the entire mixed action and relying on the
law of restitution, the court held that an insurer in a mixed action claim is entitled to
seek reimbursement of defense costs attributable to claims that are not even
potentially covered under its policy. 5 1 "The insurer therefore has a right of
reimbursement that is implied in law as quasi-contractual, whether or not it has one
that is implied in fact in the policy as contractual.' ' 53 In response to the second
question, the court held that in a mixed action the costs which may be reimbursed are
the costs that are reasonably allocated solely to those claims that are not even
potentially covered. 5 4 In response to its third and fourth questions, the court held
that in a mixed action when the insurer seeks reimbursement of defense costs from the
insured, the insurer has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.155
I. THE RIGHT TO SEEK REIMBURSEMENT AS ESTABLISHED BY Buss AND ITS
PROGENY

A liability insurer which has provided a defense to its insured under a
reservation of rights for claims which are potentially covered but are ultimately

145. See id. at 458.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See Buss, 939 P.2d at 772.
See Buss, 917 P.2d at 1165, aftd, 939 P.2d 766 (1997).
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 768.
See id. at 772-75.
Id. at 775.
See id.
See id. at 776-77.
Id at 777.
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 778.

155. Seeid. at778.
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determined non-covered may not recover its defense costs from its insured' 56 If the
defense provided is in a mixed action and at least one of the claims had potential for
coverage, the insurer has the duty to defend the entire action.'57 In this situation the
insurer may recover its defense costs for claims ultimately determined not to be
potentially covered provided it specifically reserved the right to seek reimbursement.' 58 Additionally, the insurer carries the burden of proof and must be able to
reasonably allocate costs to the non-covered claims. 59
A.

The Dut' to Defend

The duty to defend is a threshold matter in the analysis of the insurer's right to
seek reimbursement. Because the insurer's duty to defend is not dependent upon
ultimate liability, an insurer's duty to defend its insured is broader than its duty to
duty to indemnify runs to claims actually covered as
indemnify. 6 ° The 1insurer's
61
facts.
the
by
proven
In contrast to the duty to indemnify, the duty to defend extends to claims that
are merely potentially covered as proven by the facts. 6 2 An insurer's duty to defend
is not limitless. 163 The duty is limited by the "nature and kind of risk covered by the
policy.' ' 164 Regardless of how broadly the duty to defend is construed, the insurer has
no duty to defend when there is no potential coverage under any theory.' 65
"Potentially covered" has been defined as "each [claim] may possibly embrace some
triggering harm of the specified sort within the policy period caused by an included
166
occurrence."'
In an action in which all claims are potentially covered, the insurer has a duty
to defend.' 67 The duty to defend is grounded in basic contract law; the policy's
language so states and the insurer has been paid premiums by the insured for a
defense. 68 In contrast, the insurer has no duty to defend in an action in which no
claim is even potentially covered. 69 This also, is based on contract law because the
insurer has not contracted to provide defense costs for claims not even potentially
70

covered. 1

In a mixed action, at least one of the claims is potentially covered and at least
one of the claims is potentially not covered. 17 ' The insurer in a mixed action does not
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id. at 775-76.
Seei at776.
See id.
See id. at 778.
See Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 921.
Montrose Chem. Corp. of Ca. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 884 (Cal. 1995).
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 773.
See Aerojet,948 P.2d at 921.
See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 175 (Cal. 1966).
See LaJolla Beach and Tennis Club v. Industr. Indem. Co, 884 P.2d 1048, 1057 (Cal. 1995).
See Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 921.
See id.
See id.
See id
See L
See U
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have the duty to defend the claim in its entirety purely arising under the law of
contracts. 72
' The insurer has the duty to defend the potentially covered claim but not
the claim which is not potentially covered.' Nevertheless, the California Supreme
Court in Buss held that the insurer has the duty to defend the entire mixed action
"prophylactically as an obligation imposed by law in support of the policy."' 17 4 The
prophylactic obligation is based upon the rationale that "to defend meaningfully, the
insured must defend immediately,"' 75 and, therefore, "to defend immediately, it must
176
defend entirely."'
The duty to defend is not dispositive on the issue of whether the insurer has the
right to seek reimbursement of defense costs on claims ultimately found not to be
covered under the applicable policy. Although the duty to defend has been
established, the right to reimbursement must be created by policy, separate contract,
reservation of rights, or restitution. Once the right to reimbursement is created, the
right must be adequately reserved.
B.

Insurer'sRight to Reimbursement

An insurer defending a mixed action will undoubtedly incur costs in connection
with its defense of the insured in order to fulfill its duty to defend. An insurer's right
to seek reimbursement in a mixed action only extends to costs clearly attributable to
claims not potentially covered. 71 7 Those costs may be recovered when the insurer has
a right to reimbursement when: (1) the policy provides for reimbursement; (2) the
insurer and insured enter into a non-waiver agreement or separate contract; (3) the
insurer provides the insured with a reservation of rights letter; or (4) the law of
restitution implies the right. 78
1. Policy Provides for Reimbursement
A contractual right of reimbursement of defense costs for non-covered claims
may be granted in the policy. If the policy itself provides for reimbursement, the
policy "would qualify itself."' 7 9 If such language were in the policy, as a matter of
contract law, the insured agreed to the right when he purchased the policy.
The core of commercial general liability policies is usually a standardized form
often prepared by the Insurance Services Office ("ISO").8 The "ISO" policy is a

172. See Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 921.
173. See id.
174. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 775.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 776.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 776.
180. See JEFREY. $7w,I EPRErAnONOF INsuRANcECom.n cis § 23.1 (1994); See also About "1S0":
InsurersDepend on the "ISO" Database(visited Oct. 29, 1999) <http:llwww.iso.com/docs/about.html>.
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benchmark policy and is subject to modifications as the insurer deems necessary."'1
The insurer is generally the drafter of the policy, but policy terms are unlikely to vary
between different insurers. 182 The "ISO" standard commercial general liability policy
does provide a clause regarding the insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense
costs for claims ultimately determined not to be covered.183
Because the insurer is the drafter of its own policy, it should be encouraged to
include a clause regarding the right to seek reimbursement in the policy provisions.
Incorporating such a clause, however, still might not adequately reserve the right.
The relevant state's law regarding construction of insurance contracts should be
consulted to determine how the language should be drafted to best protect the right
and xvithstand judicial construction. The majority of jurisdictions have adopted the
reasonable expectations doctrine.' 84 The reasonable expectations doctrine may apply
to the construction of ambiguous insurance contracts or contracts containing
exclusions which are "obscure or technical or are hidden in complex policy
Therefore, a clause reserving the right to seek reimbursement of
language. '
defense costs for claims ultimately found not to be covered should be written in plain
language and not buried in the policy. Even if a clause for reimbursement is included
in the policy language, the insurer may wish to bolster its right by entering into a nonwaiver agreement or including the right in a reservation of rights letter.
2. Non-Waiver Agreement/Separate Contract
A non-waiver agreement or separate contract is an express agreement between
the insurer and insured that the insurer may conduct a defense of the insured without
committing itself to indemnity. 186 The insurer offers the express agreement and
normally it must be accepted by the insured in writing.'87 An insurer may enter into
a separate agreement, supported by consideration, with the insured seeking a right to
reimbursement or some type of exchange in return for the promise. 8 ' A non-waiver
agreement is a bilateral contract.' 89 Therefore, a contract of this nature would
supersede the policy pro tanto.190
An insurance company is not required to enter into a bi-lateral non-waiver
agreement in order to preserve its rights to deny coverage after it has accepted the

181. See SMIuEt. supra note 180; Telephone interview with Don Beckel, Assistant Regional Manager, in Dallas,
Texas, Insurance Services Offices, Inc. (Oct. 29, 1999).
182. See Smi'aEt, supranote 180.
183. Interview with Don Beck-el, supra note 181.
184. See Max True Plastering Co.v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 86 1, n. 5 (Okla. 1996) (listing cases from
jurisdictions which have adopted the reasonable expectations doctrine).
185. Id. at 868.
186. See BARRYR. ORAGER&THOMASR.NEwMANHANDBoOKONINstJRANcECoVERAGEDsPUtrEs546(9thed.
1994).
187. See id. But see Shelby Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. United States Fidelity& Guar. Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 309, 31012 (Ala. 1990) (insurer not estopped from later denying coverage even when insured failed to sign the non-waiver
agreement provided by the insurer).
188. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 776.
189. See Haralambos,241 Cal Rptr. at 432.
190. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 776.
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insured's defense. 9 ' The insurer can protect its rights by a reservation of rights
192
letter.
3. Reservation of Rights Letter
In contrast to a non-waiver agreement which is a bi-lateral agreement, a
reservation of rights letter is a unilateral instrument.193 The purpose of the
reservation of rights letter is to enable the insured to make informed decisions
94
regarding whether he needs to take some type of action to protect his interests.
Therefore, the insurer should include in its reservation of rights letter any reason why
195
the insured may not be entitled to coverage under the policy.
With regard to an insurer preserving any right it may have back against the
insured, such as the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs, the insurer must
include language in the reservation of rights letter to give notice to the insured of how
it will or how it may proceed under such a right. 196 The insured must be provided

with such notice to determine whether to accept the insurer's defense or to defend

itself.197 Although, the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs is implied in law,

it nevertheless must be reserved. 98 However, whether the insured agrees or disagrees
with the reservation of rights is irrelevant because the insurer has the right of
reimbursement implied in law as quasi-contractual, whether or not it has that right
implied in fact as contractual. 99

4. Restitution
The insurer has the right to seek reimbursement for defense costs as to claims
that are not even potentially covered. 2°° The right is implied in law. 201 It is
important to note that an insurer seeking the right to recover defense costs under a
restitution theory may do so only in the defense of a mixed cause action.2 2
The rationale for allowing reimbursement of defense costs for claims which are
not even potentially covered is predicated on basic restitution law.203 The insurer

191. See ALLAND. WNVDT, INsuRANcECLAIMS ANDDIsPuIEs § 2.18 (2nd ed. 1982).
192. A reservation of rights letter will generally protect the insurer's right to deny coverage after it has undertaken
the defense of the insured; however, with regard to the issue of seeking reimbursement of defense costs, a simple
reservation of rights letter may not be enough. See discussion infra Part I. B.
193. See OsTRAGER supranote 186, at 547.
194. See WINT, supra note 191, at § 2.13.
195. See id.
196. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 784 n.27.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 775-77 n.12 (discussing the court's disapproval ofAMICO, Haralambosand Lesher
because those courts required the insured to agree to the reservation of rights).
200. See id. at 776.
201. See id. at 776-78 n.14 (disapproving of the decisions in Haralambosand Lesher because they held that the
insurer does not have a right of reimbursement against the insured which is implied in law as quasi-contractual).
202. See id. at 775-76.
203. See id. at 776.
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must prophylactically defend mixed action claims 2" and thereby incurs costs for
defending such claims. Regarding the defense costs of the non-covered claims, the
insurer has not been paid premiums by the insured.2 5 The insurer did not bargain to
shoulder these costs. 206 Under the law of restitution a person "who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other."2 7 The
Buss court premised its decision on the insured's unjust enrichment through the
insurer's "bearing of unbargained-for defense costs."20 3
C.

Exercising the Insurer'sRight to Seek Reimbursement

Once the insurer establishes the right to reimbursement by means of the
foregoing methods, the insurer must exercise the right in order to receive the
benefit. 2 9 Exercising the right to reimbursement requires (1) ajudicial determination
of negative coverage; 210 (2) an adequate reservation of rights;211 (3) an allocation of
costs;212 and (4) proof necessary to obtain reimbursement by a preponderance of the
evidence. 1 3
1. Judicial Determination of Negative Coverage
Insurers are not entitled to reimbursement of their defense costs attributable to
non-covered claims before there has been a judicial determination of negative
coverage. 14 The rationale is that until a determination of no coverage has been
215
made, the claims are potentially covered and the insurer has the duty to defend.
Once it has been determined that the claim is not potentially covered, the insurer's
duty to defend is extinguished.2 16 The duty to defend can only be extinguished
until it can prove that
prospectively, not retroactively. 2 7 An insurer must defend
218
there are no claims which are covered under the policy.
A negative determination of no duty to defend does not necessarily entitle an
insurer to reimbursement of costs expended on defense of claims on behalf of the
insured. The insurer must adequately reserve its right to reimbursement.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 921; See Buss, 939 P.2d at 775; See discussion supraPart 111. A.
See Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 921.
See id.
See id. at 920.
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 777.

209. See id. at 776-78.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See U at773.
Seei.
See id. at 778.
See id.
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 773.
See id.
See id.

217. See id.
218. See id.
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2. Adequate Reservation of Rights
An insurer who desires to recover his costs of defending non-covered claims
must clearly reserve the right to do so to avoid waiving its right or to avoid the loss
of the right through estoppel. 2 9 The insurer must expressly reserve the right to
reimbursement of defense costs either by agreement or by a clear reservation of its
right to later sue for reimbursement.220 Although a reservation of rights letter does
not evidence or imply the insured's consent to the insurer's reservation of rights, a
unilateral reservation of rights may be effective.2 21 If the insured knew of the
insurer's intent to seek reimbursement if the insurer were found to have no duty to
defend, the reservation of rights in this instance would be effective. 222 "Because the
right is the insurer's alone, it may be reserved by it unilaterally." 2 3 However, in
addition to adequately reserving its right to seek reimbursement, the insurer must be
able to prove the defense costs.
3. Allocation of Costs
If the insurer is entitled to seek reimbursement of its defense costs expended in
defending a claim with no potential for coverage, it must show that the costs can be
allocated solely to the claims that were not potentially covered. 224 The rationale
behind allowing allocation of costs is that the insurer has not been paid premiums
with regard to claims that are not potentially covered. 2' The insurer must also prove
that the costs were not reasonably related to any potentially covered claims.226 If the
claims are easily distinguishable, the allocation may be accomplished with little
effort.2 2 7 However, if the claims are inextricably intertwined, greater care should be
228
taken in separating the costs.
4. Burden of Proof
In a mixed action when the insurer is seeking reimbursement of its defense costs,
the insurer carries the burden of proof.229 The burden of proof necessary to obtain

219. See id. at 784 n.27.
220. See Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 272-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
221. See Walbrook, 726 F. Supp. at 784; But see Robert A. Zeavin, et al., How to Handle Coverage Disputes,
INIRoDucnoBusINSuRANc:LAWADLrnAmGON635,676-77 (Practising Law Institute ed. 1985) (pointing
out that authorities are split on whether an insured must expressly consent to a unilateral reservation of rights).
222. See Walbrook,726 F.Supp. at 784.
223. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 784 n.27.
224. See id. at 778.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 778 n. 15.
227. Telephone interview with John R. Brydon, Attorney, Haines, Lea & Brydon (October 25, 1999) (Mr. Brydon
was co-counsel with James E. Gibbons representing Transamerica Insurance Company in Buss v. Superior Court. Mr.
Brydon indicated that little attempt was made to segregate costs in the Buss action because the main claims, breach of
contract and defamation, were easily distinguishable).
228. Id.
229. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 778.
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reimbursement for defense costs is by a preponderance of the evidence."
The right to seek reimbursement has its limitations. The right to seek
reimbursement founded upon the doctrine of restitution is limited to the defense of
mixed actions? 1 As a matter of common sense, an insurer considering seeking the
right to reimbursement would want to base that decision on the amount of defense
costs expended and the ability of the insured to reimburse those defense costs. It
would not make sense to spend time recouping a small amount of money which would
exceed the cost to seek the reimbursement. Additionally, it does not make sense to
spend time and money to seek reimbursement from an insured which cannot possibly
pay.
IV. WiLL OKLAHOMA HOP ON THE Buss?
Oklahoma has limited case law on the issue of the right to seek reimbursement.
Therefore, to speculate what Oklahoma courts will do when deciding the issue
requires an analysis of other jurisdictions. California law should be considered as it
provides the most in-depth treatment on the issue. Additionally, Oklahoma insurance
law closely comports with California insurance law. Lastly, it is worthwhile to
glimpse at what other jurisdictions are holding on the issue.
A.

Oklahoma Still Waitingfor the Buss

Oklahoma has only one case that discusses the insurer's right to seek
reimbursement: Tri-Sate Ins. Co. v. Hobbs. 2 However, the usefulness of that
opinion on the insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense costs is questionable
and speculative. The holding only applies to a very specific circumstance. 2 33 The
insured, Hobbs, was a common carrier of freight.234 Tri-State was the insurer who
provided compulsory liability insurance required by the State as a condition precedent
to receiving a common carrier's permit. 5 The underlying action was a claim by a
third party for property damage resulting from Hobbs' freight operations. 36 Under
the special endorsement clause, the policy between Hobbs and Tri-State required the
insured to reimburse the insurer for any payments made by the insurer, which under
the terms of the policy, it would not have been required to make except for the
regulations of the Corporation Commission. 37 In other words, if the insured
presented a claim for which the insurer was not liable except under the Corporation
Commission's regulations, the insurer was entitled to reimbursement of payments. 8

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See id.
Seeid.
See Tri-State, 347 P.2d 226.
See id. at 229.
See id. at 228.
See id. at 229.
See id. at 228.
See id.
See Tri-State, 347 P.2d at 228.
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The court held that where the Corporation Commission's regulations enlarged the
policy to cover third persons, the agreement by the insured under the policy to
reimburse payments to the insurer was valid.2 39 The court's rationale was that but
for the Corporation Commission's regulations, the insurer would not have had to
cover the claim.24 Further, the policy behind common carrier liability is to protect
the public and third persons - not to regulate the insurer/insured relationship.241
The holding addressed a very specific set of acts, and the opinion's usefulness
on the insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense costs was further questioned
by the fact that the policy referred to reimbursement of payments.242 The opinion is
unclear whether "payments" includes reimbursement of defense costs or if it
contemplates reimbursement ofindemnity payments. However, perhaps the rationale
underpinning the holding could be analogized to the insurer of an insured tendering
the defense ofmultiple claims - but for the insurer's duty to defend the entire action,
the insurer would not have to cover the claim(s) not potentially covered. This was the
same equitable logic and rationale that eventually lead the California Supreme Court
to hold as it did in Buss.
B.

Will Oklahoma Catch the Buss?

With scant case law on point, the only way to speculate what Oklahoma will do
when confronted with the issue of whether the insurer in a mixed action may claim
the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs expended on claims ultimately found
not to be covered, is to assess the same road California courts took to reach the
decision in Buss. In other words, the logical way to gauge the status of Oklahoma
insurance law on reimbursement is to use California law as a basis. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has noted that California insurance case law nearly comports with the
rules the Oklahoma courts have established for the interpretation of insurance
contracts.243 In furtherance of this proposition, Oklahoma has adopted California law
on at least two other insurance issues: (1)the reasonable expectations doctrine; 2' and
(2) the insurer's absolute duty of good faith and fair dealing.245 Therefore, while
certainly not conclusive, Oklahoma may conceivably look to California law on the
issue of reimbursement.
As discussed above, the threshold issue in a reimbursement analysis is whether
the insurer had the duty to defend. 2' Similar to California law, in Oklahoma the

239. See id. at 229.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.at 228.
243. See Conner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 770,774 (Okla. 1972). See also Max True Plastering Co. v.
U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 866 (Okla. 1996) (referring again to the view expressed in Conner that
California and Oklahoma have similar rules for the interpretation of insurance contracts).
244. See Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 866-69 (Okla. 1996) (discussing
and adopting the reasonable expectations doctrine as set forth in Gray).
245. See Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1978) (adopting the holding in
Gruenbergv. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1049 (Cal. 1973)).
246. See discussion infra Part mII.
A.
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insurer's duty to defend claims against its insured is an ex contractuobligation. 247
The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. 248 However, the duty is
not limitless and, therefore, is measured by the nature and kinds of risks covered and
the reasonable expectations of the insured.249 An insurer has the duty to defend when
the facts "give rise to the potential of liability under the policy." 250 These Oklahoma
principles regarding the insurer's duty to defend are the same principles applied under
California insurance law. Where the two states differ is regarding the duty to defend
claims in a mixed action - this is where the Buss opinion separates Oklahoma and
California in the analysis.
The crux of the Buss opinion was devoted to determining the insurer's right to
seek reimbursement of defense costs and hinged upon whether an insurer has a duty
to defend all claims in a mixed action. The Buss court held that the insurer has the
duty to defend the entire mixed action "prophylactically, as an obligation imposed by
law in support of the policy."'" Although Oklahoma has yet to address the insurer's
duty to defend in a mixed action, it would not be the first time Oklahoma has
insurance contracts - the duty of good
considered an implied in law duty regarding
52
faith and fair dealing is implied in law.2
The duty of good faith and fair dealing, as adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, is an implied in law duty.253 The duty to defend all claims in a mixed action,
as decided by the California Supreme Court, is an implied in law duty.' Achieving
and maintaining equity is the key rationale supporting these two implied duties. The
rationale for implying a duty of good faith and fair dealing is the unequal bargaining
and economic power between the insurer and the insured. 5 The rationale for an
implied in law duty to defend all claims in a mixed action is that "[t]o defend
meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately... and to defend immediately, it
must defend entirely." 6 Without this policy, insurers would have to make the time
consuming determination of which claims to defend. That type approach would slow
down the process and be unfair to the insured. Additionally, under modern notice
pleading, almost all claims as plead appear to have potential for coverage on their
face.25 7
After the Buss court implied the duty to defend an entire mixed action, the
consequences of forcing the insurer to defend all claims resulted in a fundamental
unfairness to the insurer if one or more of those claims was later determined to have
no potential for coverage. Stated more simply, the insured may receive a defense for
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248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See First Bank of Turley v. Fidelity and Deposit Ins. Co. of Md., 928 P.2d 298, 302-03 (Okla. 1996)
See id.
See id; see also Moskopoulos, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52; Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 921; Gray, 419 P.2d at 175.
See Turley, 928 P.2d at 303.
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 775.
See Christian,577 P.2d at 904.
See id.
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 775.
See Christian,577 P.2d at 902.
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 775.
See id.
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which it never bargained. 8 The insured did not pay premiums to the insurer with
regard to defense costs for claims which ultimately were not covered, and the insurer
did not bargain to bear these costs.' 9 To remedy the unjust enrichment of the
insured, the Buss court, using the doctrine of restitution, held an insurer may seek
reimbursement for defense costs of claims determined not to be even potentially
covered.26 ° Under the law of restitution "such a right runs against the person who
benefits from
'unjust enrichment' and in favor of the person who suffers loss
261
thereby."
Restitution is a recognized and firmly rooted ground for recovery in Oklahoma
262
which cuts across many areas of the law including contracts, torts, and estate law.
In Oklahoma unjust enrichment "arises not only where an expenditure by one person
adds to the property of another, but also where the expenditure saves the other from
expense or loss. ''263 Before a party may recover for unjust enrichment, "there must
be enrichment to another coupled with a resulting injustice."2 " Oklahoma law on
restitution runs parallel with the rationale underpinning the holding in Buss.
In Oklahoma, the principles of law on the duty to defend and unjust enrichment
are very similar to California law principles on the duty to defend and unjust
enrichment. The primary difference between Oklahoma and California law regarding
these issues is that Oklahoma has not litigated the extent of an insurer's duty to
defend in a mixed action. With little Oklahoma case law on the issue of reimbursement and because Oklahoma has adopted California law on other insurance law
issues, Oklahoma likely will adopt the Buss opinion or the Buss rationale.
C.

OtherReasons Oklahoma May Ride the Buss

If the similarities between Oklahoma and California insurance law are not
persuasive enough to Oklahoma courts, the law of other jurisdictions may be
persuasive. Because Oklahoma is in the Tenth Circuit, it would not be unusual for
an Oklahoma court to look to other Tenth Circuit jurisdictions for guidance on these
issues when the case of first impression arises.

258. See U
259. See id. at 776.
260. See id.
261. Id. at777.
262. See N.C. Corff Partnership v. OXY USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288, 295 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996). See also Warren
v. Century Bankeorporation, 741 P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987) (holding that a constructive trust may be used in order
to force restitution from one who was unjustly enriched); Welling v. Am. Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., 617 P.2d 206
(Okla. 1980) (allowing statutory damages for a cause of action of unjust enrichment); Okla. Stat. tit. 78, § 88 (1999)
(allowing damages and statutory attorney fees for unjust enrichment for misappropriation under Oklahoma's Uniform
Trade Secrets Act); French Energy, Inc. v. Alexander, 818 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Okla. 1991) (permitting estate executor
and estate attorney to retain proceeds from judicial sale of oil and gas lease would result in unjust enrichment, and
therefore, the basis of recovery allowable is under the doctrine of unjust enrichment).
263. McBride v. Bridges, 215 P.2d 830, 832 (Okla. 1950);See alsoBooker v. Sears Rocbuck & Co., 785 P.2d 297,
303 (Okla. 1989).
264. Teel v. Public Serv. Co. of Okla., 767 P.2d 391, 398 (Okla. 1985) (superseded by statute on other grounds).
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1. The Tenth Circuit
Colorado has litigated the insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense costs
from the insured. 265 Much like the development of California law on the right to seek
reimbursement, Colorado began with determining the extent of the duty to defend.2 66
In Hecla Mining Co. v. New HampshireIns. Co., the Colorado Supreme Court held
that if an underlying complaint asserts more than one claim, the insurer has the duty
to defend against all the claims if any one of the asserted claims is potentially covered
by the policy.2 67 The opinion is unclear whether the insurer sought reimbursement of
defense costs; however, the court, while discussing the duty to defend, implied that
an insurer may seek reimbursement:
[t]he appropriate course of action for an insurer who believes that it is under no
obligation to defend, is to provide a defense to the insured under a reservation of
its rights to seek reimbursement should the facts at trial prove that the incident
resulting in liability was not covered by the policy, or to file a declaratory
judgment action after the underlying case has been adjudicated.' s
Although it can be implied that there is a right to seek reimbursement, the opinion is
unclear whether the right refers to a right to seek reimbursement of defense costs from
the insured or a right to seek reimbursement of defense costs from an excess liability
insurer. In fact, two different Colorado courts use the language in Hecla as
instructive on either interpretation.
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Employers' FireInsuranceCo. v. Western
GuarantyFundServices interpreted Hecla in the context of a general liability insurer
seeking reimbursement of defense costs from an excess liability insurer. 6 However,
the court confused the issue by stating that "[w]hether such language would be
sufficient, under Hecla, to put an insured on notice of a possible future claim for
reimbursement of defense costs, we need not decide." 270 The issue regarding defense
costs was between two insurers and not the insurer and insured. The court's
statement is vague and confusing at best; however, in another division of the
Colorado Court of Appeals, that court cited both Hecla and Employers' Fire for the
proposition that the insurer may seek reimbursement of defense costs from the
insured.271
In Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Peters the insurer undertook defense of the
insured's lawsuit while pursuing a declaratory judgment action regarding whether it
had a duty to defend the insured.272 One of the issues before the court was whether
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268.
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271.
272.

See Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
See id.
See id. at 1090.
Id.
SeeEmployer's FireInsurance Co. v. WesternGuaranty Fund Services, 924 P.2d 1107 (Col.Ct. App. 1996).
Seeidat lll3.
See Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Peters, 948 P.2d 80, 84 (Colo. CL App. 1997).
See id. at 83.
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the duty to defend was moot because the underlying litigation had been settled. 2" The
court reasoned that while settlement of the underlying action meant the insurer would
not have to continue defending the insurer's interest, the insured had a contingent
liability for the costs of defense, and therefore, the issue of the duty to defend was not
moot.274 In finding that the insured had a contingent liability for the costs of defense,
the court relied on Hecla and Employer's Fire.275 The proposition in those cases was
that if the insurer defended under a reservation of rights, and it was later determined
that the insurer had no duty to defend, the insurer could seek reimbursement of
defense costs from the insured.276 Although the issue before the court was not the
right to seek reimbursement, the court acknowledged the right by holding that due to
the existence of the right to seek reimbursement, a settlement of the underlying action
does not make the issue of the duty to defend moot.277 Therefore, the court
acknowledged the existence of the insurer's right to seek reimbursement but failed to
discuss the rationale for allowing that right.
In the most recent decision from Colorado, Flanneryv. Allstate InsuranceCo.,
the court employed the Buss rationale regarding the right of the insurer to seek
reimbursement from the insured for defense costs.278 In Flannery, Flannery
Properties, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Ron Byrne alleging eleven claims regarding a
dispute over legal boundaries of property.279 Byrne counterclaimed against Flannery
alleging (1) slander of title; (2) abuse of process; (3) trespass; and (4) business
disparagement.280 Flannery tendered the defense of the counterclaims to Allstate
Insurance Company.2 81 Allstate refused to defend any of the claims against
Flannery. 2 Flannery filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking declaratory relief
that Allstate had the duty to defend and seeking monetary relief for breach of contract
and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.283 The district
court held that Allstate's only duty was to defend the trespass action.2 84 The
underlying case between Flannery and Byrne proceeded to trial, and Flannery
prevailed as to some claims but lost on Byrne's trespass counterclaim.285
Even though the district court found that Allstate had a duty to defend the
trespass counterclaim, Allstate still refused to defend Flannery.286 The federal
district court action was still viable because the issue of breach of the covenant of

273. See id. at 85.
274. See id.
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See id. at 84.
See HoraceMann, 948 P.2d at 85.
See Flannery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 F. Supp.2d 1223 (D. Colo. 1999).
See idat 1224.
See id
See id
See id
See idat 1225.
See Flannery,49 F.Supp. 2d at 1225.
See id
See id
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good faith and fair dealing remained unadjudicated. 2 7 In that action, both parties
sought summary judgment. Allstate's motion for summary judgment sought a
determination that Allstate was not liable for any fees and costs incurred by Mr.
Flannery in defending against the non-trespass counterclaims.288 The court noted the
lack of authority on the issue and looked outside the jurisdiction. 289 Specifically, the
court looked to and adopted the Buss rationale which created a quasi-contractual
right of reimbursement of defense costs for claims not even potentially covered only
if the insurer defended under a reservation of rights or the policy so provided.29
However, because Allstate refused to defend and did not provide a defense, the court
held that Allstate was responsible to pay for the defense costs attributed to all claims
291
not just the trespass claim.
In short, while the Colorado Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
issue of reimbursement, other Colorado courts appear to be heading toward adopting
Buss. In Hecla Mining Co. v. New HampshireIns. Co., the court implied that an
insurer may seek reimbursement of defense costs from its insured as long as the
insurer provides a defense to the insured under a reservation of rights seeking
reimbursement of defense costs. 292 The courts in Employers' Fire InsuranceCo. v.
Western Guaranty Fund Services and Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Peters
acknowledged that the insurer has a possible claim for reimbursement of defense
costs when the insured has notice of the insurer's claimed right to seek reimbursement
of defense costs.293 The most recent Colorado opinion on the issue of reimbursement
did not fully litigate the issue; however; the court embraced the rationale of Buss and
its progeny. 294 There is nothing to suggest that the Colorado Supreme Court will
stray from the Buss path.
-

2. Other Jurisdictions
The issue of the right of the insurer to seek reimbursement of defense costs from
its insured is not limited to the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. The different courts
considering the reimbursement issue have done so in varying depths of treatment.
Nevertheless, the opinions provide guidance and direction on the right to seek
reimbursement of defense costs.
a. Texas
The first case in Texas on the issue of reimbursement, HartfordAccident &
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See id
See id. at 1229.
See id. at 1231.
See Flannery,49 F.Supp. 2d at 1231-32.
See id.
See Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1090.
See Employers' Fire,924 P.2d at 1113; Horace Mann, 948 P.2d at 84.
See Flannery,49 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
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Indemnity Company v. LTV Corp., only implicitly discusses reimbursement of
defense costs.2 95 Although the court did not specifically address the issue, it alluded,
296
in dicta, that a claim for reimbursement may arise under an insurance policy.
Unfortunately, the decision contains no further discussion that would clearly define
what conditions or circumstances should be satisfied in order to obtain reimbursement
of defense costs.
In In re Hansel, a Texas bankruptcy court was presented with the issue of
whether an insurer is entitled to seek reimbursement of defense costs. 29 7 The court
addressed whether the insurer was entitled to an equitable right of reimbursement.298
The court found that there was no equitable right of restitution of litigation costs relying on holdings in Reliance Ins. Co. v. Alan, Ins. Co. of the West v. Haralambos
Beverage Co., and TravelersIns. Co. v. Lesher.2 99 However, it should be noted that
all three of those opinions relied upon by the Hansel court were subsequently
3
overruled by Buss v. Superior Court. 00
The court further discussed whether a right to reimbursement could be found
in the reservation of rights letter as argued by the insurer. 3 ' The court held that a
reservation of rights does not exist when there has been, at a minium, no unilateral
communication of the right sought. 3 °2 The reservation of rights letter provided to the
insured did not include language that the insurer expected the insured to reimburse
it for the costs of defense should it be found to have no duty to defend. 3 Additionally, the policy did not provide for reimbursement, and the parties did not have a nonwaiver agreement. 3' Because the insured did not have notice of the insurer's intent
to seek reimbursement, the court found that the insurer was not entitled to recover
30 5
litigation costs.
A recent Texas Court of Appeals opinion, MatagordaCounty v. Tex. Ass'n of
Counties County Gov't Risk ManagementPool, noted the lack of Texas law on the
insurer's right to reimbursement.0 6 The court looked to other jurisdictions that have
examined the issue - including the California opinion in Buss.3 7 The court
determined when Texas law on quasi-contracts and restitution is applied to the
insurer's right to seek reimbursement, Texas should follow the same rationale as used
in federal and sister states' courts - Buss." 8 Although a restitution theory was
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See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. LTV Corp., 774 F.2d 677, 680 (5L Cir. 1985).
See id.
See In re Hansel, 160 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
See id. at 70.
See id.
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 787.
See In re Hansel, 160 B.R. at 70.

302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. SeeMatagordaCountyv.Tex.Ass'n ofCuntiesCounty Gov'tRiskManagementPool, 975 S..
(Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
307. See id.
308. See id. at784-85.
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applied, the court found the insurer had no right to seek reimbursement absent
specific notice. 30 9 The insurer provided coverage under a reservation of rights letter
but failed to include any language in the reservation of rights that would give310
the
insured notice of the insurer's intention to seek reimbursement of defense costs.
In the most recent decision from Texas, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, considered the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs upon a motion by the insurer.3 ' The court relied on the
opinions in In re Hansel and MatagordaCounty and found that in order to preserve
the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs, the reservation of rights letter must
3
specifically notify the insured that the insurer has the intent to seek reimbursement. 12
In Texas, the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs has been addressed
by a Texas bankruptcy court, appellate court and federal district court. Although,
the Supreme Court of Texas has yet to render an opinion on the issue, the trend of the
lower courts indicates the insurer has the right to seek reimbursement provided the
insured has notice of the insurer's intent to seek reimbursement.
b. Louisiana
In Resure, Inc. v. ChemicalDistrib.,Inc.,313 a declaratoryjudgrnent action, the
court determined that the allegations against the insured clearly came within the
policy exclusions, and therefore, the insurer did not have a duty to defend.314 The
court held that where the insurer timely reserved its rights under the policy and the
reservation specifically addressed reimbursement of defense costs, the insurer was
entitled to reimbursement of its defense costs because the insured failed to object to
the reservation of rights.315
c. Massachusetts
In Millipore Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., the court held that if at the time
the claims were advanced, the insurer could reasonably have concluded that no aspect
of the claims fell within the scope of coverage, the possibility of coverage was enough
to trigger the duty to defend. 3 6 The claims in the case were determined reasonable,
and thus, the insurer had the duty to defend. 7 A later determination of no duty to
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See id. at 785.
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See Alliance General Ins. Co. v. Club Hospitality, Inc., 1999 WL 500229, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 14, 1999).
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defend does not negate the duty to defend. 1 8 The court held the insurer was not
entitled to reimbursement of defense costs prior to summary judgment on the
coverage issue.3 19
V. CONCLUSION

Oklahoma is likely to look to and adopt the Buss opinion and its rationale.
California insurance law is and has been persuasive on the issue and is also consistent
with general principles of insurance law in Oklahoma. Although the issue of a
commercial insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense costs from its insured
in a mixed action does not appear to have been heavily litigated across the United
States, Buss has greatly enhanced the issue. A number of jurisdictions have either
expressly adopted Buss or have impliedly adopted the restitution rationale set forth
inBuss. 32 Any analysis of the insurer's right to seek reimbursement of defense costs
in a mixed action for a claim or claims which never had potential for coverage will
require a critical look at Buss. Therefore, when the Buss does come through
Oklahoma, Oklahoma will probably be consistent with past precedent and follow
California law -- i.e. Oklahoma should ride the Buss.
Melinda L. Kirk

318. See id.
319. Seeid.at36.
320. See discussion infra Part Ill. C. See also Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Blazer, 51 F.Supp. 2d 1080, 1090-91 (D.
Nev. 1999) (holding that the right to reimbursement does not arise unless there is an understanding between the insurer
and the insured that the insured will seek reimbursement of costs); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Shierk, 996
F.Supp. 836, 839 (S.D. IMl.1998) (predicting that the Illinois Supreme Court will adopt the reimbursement rationale
as held in Buss); Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 823 F.2d 276,283-84 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the law of Hawaii,
the court held that the insurer was entitled to demand reimbursement ofdefense costs based on reservation ofrights, and
doing so does not amount to bad faith); Knapp v. Commonwealth Land & Title Ins. Co., 932 F.Supp. 1169 (D. Minn.
1996) (holding pre-Buss and looking to California law for guidance that an insurer may have an implied right to
reimbursement of defense costs if the insurer reserved the right to reimbursement).
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